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Hi Ben,<br>
<br>
This was my answer to G Peck's query before I learnt about the call for
international aid:<br>
<br>
As you may have noticed on the Disaster Diplomacy website, evidences
from previous cases show that disasters are usually unlikely to have a
long-lasting diplomatic effect. They may catalyze pre-existing trends
but seldom initiate new diplomacy. On the long run, non-disaster
factors have a more significant impact on diplomacy than
disaster-related activities.<br>
<br>
I do not know very well the case of Myanmar. Yet, my feeling would be
that there are some on-going changes both influenced by internal and
external factors. In this context, the present disaster and related
relief and rehabilitation/reconstruction activities may have an impact.
On the local side, if national authorities fail to provide the victims
with appropriate aid, it may indeed increase people's ressentment
against the junta. But do people vote according to their own opinion or
are there other factors influencing individuals' decision? Vote buying,
threat, violence, etc., are non-disaster factors which may have a
strong influence as well. A way for the disaster to have a sweeping
local influence would be to trigger a massive popular upheaval but it
seems unlikely in Burma, is it?<br>
<br>
On the international side, will the junta continue to refuse the
foreign aid? If not, it may be an entry for Western NGO to the
grassroot level and it may be of importance. It did in Aceh but Aceh
was almost totally closed to foreign organizations before the tsunami
and the turning effect was brutal; maybe more than it would be in the
case of Burma. Furthermore, even if foreign NGOs will be able to
conduct grassroot relief and rehabilitation activities, what will be
the level of control/influence of Burma authorities? Finally, I doubt,
but I may be wrong of course, that the disaster will have a strong
international effect and influence Western states' policies. The
disaster is presently topping the headlines of international media
(both CNN and French TV opened this morning with footages of damages in
Burma) but it is unlikely to last for more than a few days. This
disaster is not unusual and rather common in Asia. On the other hand, I
am not sure if the Sept. 2007 events, which were unusual and stirred
international attention, radicaly changed the West 's position. If not,
the disaster may be of marginal influence.<br>
<br>
These are some rough thoughts.<br>
<br>
Best wishes,<br>
<br>
JC<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix-request@ecie.org">radix-request@ecie.org</a> a écrit :<br>
<blockquote cite="mid200805051611.m45GBtcB042493@ECIE.ORG" type="cite">
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
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Today's Topics:
1. Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy (Ilan Kelman)
2. Re: Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy (<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>)
3. Re: Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy (George Kent)
4. Re: Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy (<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>)
5. Re: Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy (<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Sun, 4 May 2008 19:53:16 +0000
From: Ilan Kelman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ilan_kelman@hotmail.com"><ilan_kelman@hotmail.com></a>
Subject: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org"><radix@ecie.org></a>
Message-ID: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:BLU107-W1195D3651B3F41B98327349AD40@phx.gbl"><BLU107-W1195D3651B3F41B98327349AD40@phx.gbl></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis">http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis</a>
Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after Cyclone Nargis
By Christopher Smith
Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48
After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating earthquake and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills.
The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.
Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.
Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll providing a real step forward for the country, there currently exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the military and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently dead in the water.
Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the Acehnese population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.
Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.
Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though what is more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at the time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to the tsunami.
With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength and cause of those opposing current government policies. Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700 killed and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to allow talks to substantively progress.
Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce the moral posturing of their demands and interests.
What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens will presumably come without the international aid worker component, and certainly out of the eye of the international media. And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to agree to a lessening of their moral position.
Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian government's relief initiatives.
Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden of a far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a more positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.
In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors that were not in place in Aceh in 2004.
Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma. Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?
The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the Indonesian government having made significant political concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to independence. GAM joined the existing political order.
Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital point is that concessions will be required of all parties.
What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-democracy leaders would serve within the existing, military, government?
But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far out at sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical opportunity for members of the military and opposition parties to come together and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove the onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free Burma.
_________________________________________________________________
Try Chicktionary, a game that tests how many words you can form from the letters given. Find this and more puzzles at Live Search Games!
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207">http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207</a>
------------------------------
Message: 2
Date: Sun, 4 May 2008 19:31:46 -0400 (GMT-04:00)
From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
To: Ilan Kelman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ilan_kelman@hotmail.com"><ilan_kelman@hotmail.com></a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Message-ID:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:30108361.1209943907475.JavaMail.root@mswamui-chipeau.atl.sa.earthlink.net"><30108361.1209943907475.JavaMail.root@mswamui-chipeau.atl.sa.earthlink.net></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Thanks for sharing Chris Smith's reflection, Ilan.
The Burmese government seems to have been very poorly prepared. They seem to have no trained relief workers as the reports are that "police and military" are conducting these efforts. I suspect Smith is correct that the military government's performance is not going to win praise among the people of Burma. As a result, if Buddhist monks have mobilized to provide assistance, as often happens in Asian countries, the contrast in response will further work to undermine whatever credibility the junta has left.
I was also struck by the fact that with so much sophisticated cyclone forecasting technology and warning systems available in the region, apparently no attempt was made to evacuate people from Haing-Gyi Island in the mouth of the Irrawaddy River. Given this lapse in state social protection, it is fortunately the death toll is not far higher than so far reported.
Cheers, BEN
-----Original Message-----
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">From: Ilan Kelman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ilan_kelman@hotmail.com"><ilan_kelman@hotmail.com></a>
Sent: May 4, 2008 3:53 PM
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Subject: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis">http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis</a>
Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after Cyclone Nargis
By Christopher Smith
Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48
After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating earthquake and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills.
The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.
Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.
Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll providing a real step forward for the country, there currently exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the military and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently dead in the water.
Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the Acehnese population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.
Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.
Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though what is more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at the time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to the tsunami.
With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength and cause of those opposing current government policies. Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700 killed and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to allow talks to substantively progress.
Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce the moral posturing of their demands and interests.
What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens will presumably come without the international aid worker component, and certainly out of the eye of the international media. And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to agree to a lessening of their moral position.
Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian government's relief initiatives.
Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden of a far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a more positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.
In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors that were not in place in Aceh in 2004.
Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma. Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?
The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the Indonesian government having made significant political concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to independence. GAM joined the existing political order.
Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital point is that concessions will be required of all parties.
What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-democracy leaders would serve within the existing, military, government?
But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far out at sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical opportunity for members of the military and opposition parties to come together and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove the onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free Burma.
_________________________________________________________________
Try Chicktionary, a game that tests how many words you can form from the letters given. Find this and more puzzles at Live Search Games!
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207">http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207</a>
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
------------------------------
Message: 3
Date: Sun, 04 May 2008 16:53:34 -1000
From: George Kent <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kent@hawaii.edu"><kent@hawaii.edu></a>
Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Message-ID: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:2094E51A-18C3-49AE-8297-DB66C80016CC@hawaii.edu"><2094E51A-18C3-49AE-8297-DB66C80016CC@hawaii.edu></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=WINDOWS-1252; format=flowed;
delsp=yes
Friends --
Disaster diplomacy is about what Smith describes as "the concept of
natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation". We
already knew that it can go either way, with disasters sometimes
facilitating conflict transformation and sometimes impeding it. Thus,
the real question on the table is under what conditions can disasters
facilitate conflict transformation? What have we learned about this
from the Aceh and Burma experiences?
I don't see any reason to limit the inquiry to natural disasters.
What is the reasoning behind the idea that disasters could pave the
road for conflict transformation? It is not obvious.
Aloha, George
On May 4, 2008, at 1:31 PM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Thanks for sharing Chris Smith's reflection, Ilan.
The Burmese government seems to have been very poorly prepared.
They seem to have no trained relief workers as the reports are that
"police and military" are conducting these efforts. I suspect Smith
is correct that the military government's performance is not going
to win praise among the people of Burma. As a result, if Buddhist
monks have mobilized to provide assistance, as often happens in
Asian countries, the contrast in response will further work to
undermine whatever credibility the junta has left.
I was also struck by the fact that with so much sophisticated
cyclone forecasting technology and warning systems available in the
region, apparently no attempt was made to evacuate people from Haing-
Gyi Island in the mouth of the Irrawaddy River. Given this lapse in
state social protection, it is fortunately the death toll is not far
higher than so far reported.
Cheers, BEN
-----Original Message-----
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">From: Ilan Kelman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ilan_kelman@hotmail.com"><ilan_kelman@hotmail.com></a>
Sent: May 4, 2008 3:53 PM
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Subject: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis">http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis</a>
Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after Cyclone
Nargis
By Christopher Smith
Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48
After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's
restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political
solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating earthquake
and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road
for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and
interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in
Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is
scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis
proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills.
The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as
disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of
Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have
historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a
solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would
prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the
opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its
foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.
Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled
negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were
underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the
conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the
groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.
Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of
measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional
referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll
providing a real step forward for the country, there currently
exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the military
and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of
conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts
through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently
dead in the water.
Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami
necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political
solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of
approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people
perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers
equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the Acehnese
population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.
Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and
property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know
of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone
Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures
skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to
have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma
as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese
will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.
Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM
and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though what is
more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is
estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in
conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In
short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at the
time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the
organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to
the tsunami.
With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has
instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength
and cause of those opposing current government policies.
Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it
is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the
military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that
Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to
impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700 killed
and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a
GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the
opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to
allow talks to substantively progress.
Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and
relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of
internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage
brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce the
moral posturing of their demands and interests.
What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens
will presumably come without the international aid worker
component, and certainly out of the eye of the international media.
And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its
central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the
morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition
leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to
agree to a lessening of their moral position.
Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives
in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of
Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian
government's relief initiatives.
Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden of a
far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and
initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts
heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a more
positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.
In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of
disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors
that were not in place in Aceh in 2004.
Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the
Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma.
Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?
The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not
seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national
political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties
in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the
Indonesian government having made significant political
concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to
independence. GAM joined the existing political order.
Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions
demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not
synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital
point is that concessions will be required of all parties.
What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and
military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to
make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-democracy
leaders would serve within the existing, military, government?
But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far out at
sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical opportunity
for members of the military and opposition parties to come together
and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the
confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove the
onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the
shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free Burma.
_________________________________________________________________
Try Chicktionary, a game that tests how many words you can form
from the letters given. Find this and more puzzles at Live Search
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
------------------------------
Message: 4
Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 09:52:20 -0400 (GMT-04:00)
From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
To: George Kent <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kent@hawaii.edu"><kent@hawaii.edu></a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Message-ID:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:18699753.1209995541784.JavaMail.root@mswamui-billy.atl.sa.earthlink.net"><18699753.1209995541784.JavaMail.root@mswamui-billy.atl.sa.earthlink.net></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Briefy and schematically -- others hopefully will disagree or add detail -- there seem to have been two kinds of recent historical experience that point to two dynamics. Both share the notion of "window of opportunity." George is certainly correct that other events can provide such a window. But since what brings people to this list serv and the RADIX web site is a critical reflection on disasters, I'll focus on them.
The first dynamic is that of uniting people in a common act of compassion. This sounds rather mushy and idealistic, but I think in the face of catastrophe, the common people who happen to be on two "sides" of a civil conflict are more inclined to transcend it even if their leadership is more cynical.
The second dynamic is that donors, multi- and bi-national partners may be able to use that window to put new pressure for a ceasefire and eventual resolution to the civil conflict. Recovery resources can well become a carrot and inducement, but, as one was in the case of Sri Lanka, such resources can also become something the two sides end up contending for.
So, as George reminds us, it can go both ways.
Best, BEN
-----Original Message-----
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">From: George Kent <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kent@hawaii.edu"><kent@hawaii.edu></a>
Sent: May 4, 2008 10:53 PM
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
Friends --
Disaster diplomacy is about what Smith describes as "the concept of
natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation". We
already knew that it can go either way, with disasters sometimes
facilitating conflict transformation and sometimes impeding it. Thus,
the real question on the table is under what conditions can disasters
facilitate conflict transformation? What have we learned about this
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->>from the Aceh and Burma experiences?
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">I don't see any reason to limit the inquiry to natural disasters.
What is the reasoning behind the idea that disasters could pave the
road for conflict transformation? It is not obvious.
Aloha, George
On May 4, 2008, at 1:31 PM, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Thanks for sharing Chris Smith's reflection, Ilan.
The Burmese government seems to have been very poorly prepared.
They seem to have no trained relief workers as the reports are that
"police and military" are conducting these efforts. I suspect Smith
is correct that the military government's performance is not going
to win praise among the people of Burma. As a result, if Buddhist
monks have mobilized to provide assistance, as often happens in
Asian countries, the contrast in response will further work to
undermine whatever credibility the junta has left.
I was also struck by the fact that with so much sophisticated
cyclone forecasting technology and warning systems available in the
region, apparently no attempt was made to evacuate people from Haing-
Gyi Island in the mouth of the Irrawaddy River. Given this lapse in
state social protection, it is fortunately the death toll is not far
higher than so far reported.
Cheers, BEN
-----Original Message-----
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">From: Ilan Kelman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ilan_kelman@hotmail.com"><ilan_kelman@hotmail.com></a>
Sent: May 4, 2008 3:53 PM
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Subject: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis">http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis</a>
Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after Cyclone
Nargis
By Christopher Smith
Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48
After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's
restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political
solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating earthquake
and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road
for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and
interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in
Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is
scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis
proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills.
The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as
disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of
Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have
historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a
solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would
prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the
opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its
foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.
Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled
negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were
underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the
conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the
groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.
Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of
measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional
referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll
providing a real step forward for the country, there currently
exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the military
and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of
conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts
through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently
dead in the water.
Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami
necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political
solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of
approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people
perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers
equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the Acehnese
population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.
Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and
property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know
of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone
Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures
skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to
have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma
as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese
will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.
Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM
and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though what is
more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is
estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in
conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In
short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at the
time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the
organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to
the tsunami.
With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has
instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength
and cause of those opposing current government policies.
Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it
is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the
military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that
Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to
impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700 killed
and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a
GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the
opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to
allow talks to substantively progress.
Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and
relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of
internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage
brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce the
moral posturing of their demands and interests.
What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens
will presumably come without the international aid worker
component, and certainly out of the eye of the international media.
And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its
central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the
morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition
leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to
agree to a lessening of their moral position.
Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives
in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of
Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian
government's relief initiatives.
Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden of a
far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and
initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts
heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a more
positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.
In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of
disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors
that were not in place in Aceh in 2004.
Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the
Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma.
Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?
The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not
seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national
political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties
in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the
Indonesian government having made significant political
concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to
independence. GAM joined the existing political order.
Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions
demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not
synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital
point is that concessions will be required of all parties.
What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and
military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to
make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-democracy
leaders would serve within the existing, military, government?
But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far out at
sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical opportunity
for members of the military and opposition parties to come together
and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the
confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove the
onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the
shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free Burma.
_________________________________________________________________
Try Chicktionary, a game that tests how many words you can form
from the letters given. Find this and more puzzles at Live Search
Games!
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207">http://g.msn.ca/ca55/207</a>
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
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<pre wrap="">
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</blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
------------------------------
Message: 5
Date: Mon, 5 May 2008 12:09:29 -0400 (GMT-04:00)
From: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
To: Richard Krajeski <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:krajeskipeterson@msn.com"><krajeskipeterson@msn.com></a>, George Kent
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:kent@hawaii.edu"><kent@hawaii.edu></a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>
Cc: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:bwisner@igc.org">bwisner@igc.org</a>, Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:gkw@MIT.EDU"><gkw@MIT.EDU></a>,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:radix@ecie.org">radix@ecie.org</a>
Message-ID:
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End of Radix Digest, Vol 82, Issue 1
************************************
</pre>
</blockquote>
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