[Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
Guy Sapirstein
guy at oriconsulting.com
Mon May 5 17:34:15 PDT 2008
The previous points regarding cohesion following the event and
subsequent conflict are nicely depicted in the attached slide
describing the timeline of the psycho-social impact of disasters.
(Please feel free to use, source is: ZUNIN, L. M. & MYERS, D. (2000).
Training Manual for Human Service Workers in Major Disasters. 2nd Ed.
Washington, DC: Department of Health and Human Services Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental
Health Services; DHHS Publication No. ADM 90-538. [available online]
http://www.mentalhealth.org/publications/allpubs/ADM90-538/
tmpreface.asp).
Best,
Guy
______________________________
Guy Sapirstein
ORI, llc

On May 5, 2008, at 12:09 PM, bwisner at igc.org wrote:
> Yes, this is a very good point. There is a leveling. There are
> also unaffected or less severely affected people who share. Mexico
> City 1985 is a good example. But as people told me in interviews
> there, "something bad happens and we come together... but we can't
> sustain it. Each is pulled back into his own concerns." So
> understanding this dynamic, as Petersen suggests, can assist those
> involved in relief and recovery AS WELL AS those concerned with
> peace making. Ideally, the two groups of people are one in the
> same, however, most first responders and relief and recovery
> personnel are not trained at all in understanding conflict. So
> conflict management would be a useful module to add to their training.
>
> Secondly, as if the complexity of disaster impacts on latent or
> overt conflict were not great enough, the IMPACT OF AID can further
> add complexities. Gabi Kruks-Wisner's (PhD student at MIT)
> preliminary interviews in two fishing villages on the coast of
> Tamil Nadu suggest that the availability of post-tsunami aid from
> 3-4 different kinds of sources resulted in patterns of access and
> shifts in social relations by class, gender, and caste.
>
> Cheers, BEN
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Richard Krajeski
> Sent: May 5, 2008 10:21 AM
> To: bwisner at igc.org, George Kent
> Cc: bwisner at igc.org, radix at ecie.org
> Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
>
> Ben states
> "The first dynamic is that of uniting people in a common act of
> compassion. This sounds rather mushy and idealistic, but I think
> in the face of catastrophe, the common people who happen to be on
> two "sides" of a civil conflict are more inclined to transcend it
> even if their leadership is more cynical."
> Peterson adds:
> The the initial time frame of the event has a leveling effect on
> the population-necessity, scarcity lend themselves to cooperative
> actions. Those actions can either be built upon for multiple good/
> justice in the region or they can turn very viciously to
> exponentially increase the tension that was pre-existing. It is
> essential that outside resources understand the dynamic and use the
> opportunity to open discourse/resources between those who were
> otherwise in conflict. This participatory approach can break
> prejudicial barriers faster than anything else I have experienced.
> It creates knowledge among those who were otherwise separate and it
> allows for change to happen.
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: bwisner at igc.org
> To: George Kent
> Cc: bwisner at igc.org ; radix at ecie.org
> Sent: Monday, May 05, 2008 8:52 AM
> Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
>
> Briefy and schematically -- others hopefully will disagree or add
> detail -- there seem to have been two kinds of recent historical
> experience that point to two dynamics. Both share the notion of
> "window of opportunity." George is certainly correct that other
> events can provide such a window. But since what brings people to
> this list serv and the RADIX web site is a critical reflection on
> disasters, I'll focus on them.
>
>
> The second dynamic is that donors, multi- and bi-national partners
> may be able to use that window to put new pressure for a ceasefire
> and eventual resolution to the civil conflict. Recovery resources
> can well become a carrot and inducement, but, as one was in the
> case of Sri Lanka, such resources can also become something the two
> sides end up contending for.
>
> So, as George reminds us, it can go both ways.
>
> Best, BEN
>
> -----Original Message-----
> >From: George Kent <kent at hawaii.edu>
> >Sent: May 4, 2008 10:53 PM
> >To: bwisner at igc.org
> >Cc: radix at ecie.org
> >Subject: Re: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
> >
> >Friends --
> >
> >Disaster diplomacy is about what Smith describes as "the concept of
> >natural disasters as paving the road for conflict transformation". We
> >already knew that it can go either way, with disasters sometimes
> >facilitating conflict transformation and sometimes impeding it. Thus,
> >the real question on the table is under what conditions can disasters
> >facilitate conflict transformation? What have we learned about this
> >from the Aceh and Burma experiences?
> >
> >I don't see any reason to limit the inquiry to natural disasters.
> >
> >What is the reasoning behind the idea that disasters could pave the
> >road for conflict transformation? It is not obvious.
> >
> >Aloha, George
> >
> >
> >
> >On May 4, 2008, at 1:31 PM, bwisner at igc.org wrote:
> >
> >> Thanks for sharing Chris Smith's reflection, Ilan.
> >>
> >> The Burmese government seems to have been very poorly prepared.
> >> They seem to have no trained relief workers as the reports are that
> >> "police and military" are conducting these efforts. I suspect
> Smith
> >> is correct that the military government's performance is not going
> >> to win praise among the people of Burma. As a result, if Buddhist
> >> monks have mobilized to provide assistance, as often happens in
> >> Asian countries, the contrast in response will further work to
> >> undermine whatever credibility the junta has left.
> >>
> >> I was also struck by the fact that with so much sophisticated
> >> cyclone forecasting technology and warning systems available in the
> >> region, apparently no attempt was made to evacuate people from
> Haing-
> >> Gyi Island in the mouth of the Irrawaddy River. Given this
> lapse in
> >> state social protection, it is fortunately the death toll is not
> far
> >> higher than so far reported.
> >>
> >> Cheers, BEN
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Ilan Kelman <ilan_kelman at hotmail.com>
> >>> Sent: May 4, 2008 3:53 PM
> >>> To: radix at ecie.org
> >>> Subject: [Radix] Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Disaster Diplomacy
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> http://wwwmizzima.com/edop/commentary/8-commentary/419-disaster-
> diplomacy-of-tsunamis-and-cyclones-burma-after-cyclone-nargis
> >>>
> >>> Disaster diplomacy – of tsunamis and cyclones, Burma after
> Cyclone
> >>> Nargis
> >>>
> >>> By Christopher Smith
> >>> Saturday, 03 May 2008 19:48
> >>>
> >>> After three decades of conflict and civil war in Indonesia's
> >>> restive province of Aceh came to a relatively rapid political
> >>> solution in the aftermath of December 2004's devastating
> earthquake
> >>> and tsunami, the concept of natural disasters as paving the road
> >>> for conflict transformation has gained in both adherents and
> >>> interest. But, as this brief comparison between the situation in
> >>> Aceh in 2004 and that of Burma today will make clear, there is
> >>> scant evidence for optimism in the devastation of Cyclone Nargis
> >>> proving the memorable catalyst of a solution to Burma's ills.
> >>>
> >>> The fact is, as recognized by numerous studies as well as
> >>> disasterdiplomacy.org, and poignantly attested to in the case of
> >>> Sri Lanka in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, natural disasters have
> >>> historically led to a spike in conflict as opposed to bringing a
> >>> solution to light. Even in Aceh, though a political solution would
> >>> prove forthcoming, the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) used the
> >>> opportunity created by the aftermath of the tsunami to accuse its
> >>> foes of terrorism and launch a series of military offensives.
> >>>
> >>> Crucially, in the case of Aceh, mediation and scheduled
> >>> negotiations between the primary protagonists to the conflict, the
> >>> Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government, were
> >>> underway prior to the tsunami. While a foreseeable solution to the
> >>> conflict was by no means certain before December 26, 2004, the
> >>> groundwork had been laid for the exploration of a solution.
> >>>
> >>> Clearly in the case of Burma, as exemplified by the lack of
> >>> measures taken to ensure that the forthcoming constitutional
> >>> referendum will be held in an atmosphere conducive to the poll
> >>> providing a real step forward for the country, there currently
> >>> exists no definable platform prepared and agreed to by the
> military
> >>> and opposition political parties ready to serve the interests of
> >>> conflict transformation. The thrust of the United Nations efforts
> >>> through its Special Envoy to Burma, Ibrahim Gambari, is currently
> >>> dead in the water.
> >>>
> >>> Additionally, the sheer statistical weight of the 2004 tsunami
> >>> necessary to add that vital extra incentive to find a political
> >>> solution in Aceh, is mind boggling. Of a pre-tsunami population of
> >>> approximately 4.2 million, an estimated 170,000 to 230,000 people
> >>> perished, with a further half million left homeless. Those numbers
> >>> equate to a death toll between four and 5.4 percent of the
> Acehnese
> >>> population, with nearly 12 percent left in need of shelter.
> >>>
> >>> Burma, hopefully, will not suffer near the loss in life and
> >>> property as did the Acehnese. However, it is far too early to know
> >>> of the true devastation wrought on Burma as a result of Cyclone
> >>> Nargis, and it may well be that casualty and damage figures
> >>> skyrocket in the upcoming days and weeks. But if Nargis were to
> >>> have a similar statistical impact on the human population of Burma
> >>> as the tsunami did on Aceh, between 1.9 and 2.6 million Burmese
> >>> will have lost their lives, with another 5.6 million homeless.
> >>>
> >>> Militarily, the 2004 tsunami dealt a significant blow to both GAM
> >>> and TNI short-term operational capabilities in Aceh. Though
> what is
> >>> more important is that in the preceding two-plus years GAM is
> >>> estimated to have lost over 25 percent of its troop strength in
> >>> conjunction with the loss of key commanders on the ground. In
> >>> short, the military arm of GAM was standing at a severe lilt at
> the
> >>> time the tsunami struck, with many analysts arguing that the
> >>> organization was looking for a way to exit the conflict prior to
> >>> the tsunami.
> >>>
> >>> With Burma, the Saffron Revolution, barely seven months past, has
> >>> instilled newfound optimism and reason to believe in the strength
> >>> and cause of those opposing current government policies.
> >>> Additionally, when speaking of possible diplomacy and dialogue, it
> >>> is commonly understood that a principle obstacle to talks is the
> >>> military's refusal to be brought to the table. It is unlikely that
> >>> Cyclone Nargis can cause losses in the military significant to
> >>> impel such an action. Even in Aceh, where the TNI lost 2,700
> killed
> >>> and saw much of its coastal operations obliterated (compared to a
> >>> GAM figure of only 70 deaths), it was contingent upon the
> >>> opposition, GAM, to make the necessary political concessions to
> >>> allow talks to substantively progress.
> >>>
> >>> Early 2005 saw Aceh inundated with international aid workers and
> >>> relief efforts, providing the conflict a degree of
> >>> internationalization it was previously not privy too. The carnage
> >>> brought upon the region also spawned political actors to reduce
> the
> >>> moral posturing of their demands and interests.
> >>>
> >>> What international relief is permitted to reach Burma's citizens
> >>> will presumably come without the international aid worker
> >>> component, and certainly out of the eye of the international
> media.
> >>> And with Burma's conflict, especially from the position of its
> >>> central democratic opposition, steeped in and committed to the
> >>> morality of its cause – it is difficult to imagine opposition
> >>> leaders and parties coming together in the wake of the cyclone to
> >>> agree to a lessening of their moral position.
> >>>
> >>> Despite some thirty years of hostilities and government offensives
> >>> in Aceh, in the months following the disaster over 80 percent of
> >>> Acehnese polled responded with a favorable view of the Indonesian
> >>> government's relief initiatives.
> >>>
> >>> Burma's military junta, isolated, poor and carrying the burden
> of a
> >>> far less than stellar track record regarding social spending and
> >>> initiatives, in all probability will not see their relief efforts
> >>> heralded by 80 percent of Burmese as sufficient and meriting a
> more
> >>> positive view of the military in Burmese political affairs.
> >>>
> >>> In the end, there are fundamental obstacles to the success of
> >>> disaster diplomacy in Burma in the wake of Cyclone Nargis, factors
> >>> that were not in place in Aceh in 2004.
> >>>
> >>> Aceh was a regional crisis, comprising two percent of the
> >>> Indonesian population, not a national one as in the case of Burma.
> >>> Will Nargis traumatize all of Burma?
> >>>
> >>> The political and armed opposition to Jakarta in Aceh was not
> >>> seeking the removal of the Indonesian government or national
> >>> political changes to the vast extent as several opposition parties
> >>> in Burma are seeking. Further, GAM entered a peace accord with the
> >>> Indonesian government having made significant political
> >>> concessions, including among others their erstwhile claim to
> >>> independence. GAM joined the existing political order.
> >>>
> >>> Burma's political conflict is stalemated. While the concessions
> >>> demanded to jumpstart dialogue by the parties concerned are not
> >>> synonymous with what occurred between GAM and Jakarta, the vital
> >>> point is that concessions will be required of all parties.
> >>>
> >>> What demands and positions will Burma's political opposition and
> >>> military rulers be willing to forego in the aftermath of Nargis to
> >>> make dialogue happen? Is it possible that opposition, pro-
> democracy
> >>> leaders would serve within the existing, military, government?
> >>>
> >>> But, just maybe – as with the early ripples of a tsunami far
> out at
> >>> sea – the aftermath of Nargis will provide a critical
> opportunity
> >>> for members of the military and opposition parties to come
> together
> >>> and work toward rebuilding Burma; one small, initial step in the
> >>> confidence building process. And this, it is hoped, would prove
> the
> >>> onset of a working relationship that will one day crash upon the
> >>> shores of Burma and give birth to a unified and conflict-free
> Burma.
> >>> _________________________________________________________________
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> >>> Games!
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> >>
> >>
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> >
> >
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